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Abstract
In this study, the simple genetic programming has been modi¯ed by the automati-
cally de¯ned terminals. An agent-based two-¯rm competition market is build to test
¯rms' survivabilities. Through the simulation, we discover the signi¯cance of genetic
operator rates in product designs by observing its impact on consumer satisfaction
and ¯rms' competitiveness.
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1 Motivation and Introduction
Extended from our previous studies Chen and Chie (2004, 2006, 2007), which
have emphasized modularity, we replicate an environment to simulate the evo-
lutionary and innovation process of commodities with genetic programming
(GP). Meanwhile, the role of genetic operators (e.g., recombination and muta-
tion) shall not be overlooked under the GP application. This can be evidenced
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from two extreme examples. One is that the market selects commodities with-
out recombination and mutation; therefore, little improvement can be made.
Another is when recombination and mutation occur too often in production so
that consumers face di®erent commodities each time choice being made. Com-
modities with positive elements are replaced with completely new creation. In
the latter, knowledge of invention is hard to accumulate and preserve. To
remedy this failure, a model with more subtlety is established to simulate
the market competition in a two-¯rm environment. Through large scale sim-
ulation, the role of genetic operator in production competencies will also be
exploited.
In Chen and Chie (2007), simple GP is modi¯ed with modularity approach,
which is automatically de¯ned terminals (ADTs). Borrowing the idea of Koza
Koza (1994), ADTs have been found to have an a±nity for knowledge accu-
mulation. The characteristics of primitive and advanced commodity designs
can be captured by ADTs. For instance, it is possible to depict the processing
of wheat to °our, and from °our to dough by introducing ADTs. The model
also shared the some similarities with Koza's automatically de¯ned functions
(ADFs), including hierarchical mechanism, simplicity, and encapsulation.
According to Goldberg (2002), if we combine crossover and selection, contin-
uous innovation will result. In like manner, the combination of mutation and
selection is the essence of improvement. However, little discussion has been
focused on the impacts brought by di®erent crossover and mutation rates,
especially in the area of agent-based economics modeling of innovation. This
paper will try to discuss these two genetic operators based on simulation re-
sults. Two observations of economic experiments have been carried out. The
¯rst one is the contribution of two competitive ¯rms to consumer satisfac-
tion under two di®erent selection pressures. The selection pressure stems from
consumer's search intensity, for instance, in a two-¯rm competition market,
consumer should visit both of the ¯rms under high search ability and only visit
one of the two ¯rms under low search ability; The second one is the importance
of genetic operators in competition among ¯rms. We follow the agent-based
model of Chen and Chie (2007) to allow a ¯rm who designs new products
with higher crossover rate or mutation rate to compete with the other ¯rm
who has lower crossover rate or mutation rate. In a sense, this is equivalent
to replicating two di®erent organizational cultures regarding the competition
between open-minded and prudent culture.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The agent-based model is in-
troduced in Section 2. Section 3 and Section 4 present two experiments with
¯ndings, followed by the concluding remarks made in Section 5.
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2 The Model
The model is calibrated under a modular economy. In Chen and Chie (2004),
we considered an economy of pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms (producers) and surplus-
maximizing consumers. Fig. 1 demonstrates the interaction between these
two sorts of agents. Producers supply commodities to the market and earn
pro¯t/incur loss as a result. Intuitively, each producer is motivated to en-
gage in product innovation and dominate the market through winning more
customer satisfaction. This is de¯ned as the \innovation" process, as shown
in the green box. Consumers, on the other side, allocate budget in a way to
maximize their respective level of satisfaction. Consumer Surplus is measured
by the di®erence of maximum willingness-to-pay and the actual price paid for
a product. The maximum willingness-to-pay is assessed by given preference,
which will be detailed later.
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Fig. 1. The agent-based modular economy.
In the following, we will introduce the parameters of agent engineering and
environment design. We ¯rst observe the attributes and behaviors of produc-
ers and consumers. For example, producers have the capability of production,
innovation, marketing and resource allocation, which are altogether subject
to individual attributes such as capital limits, knowledge, and cultural factors.
With a closer investigation, we ¯nd that genetic operators play an important
role in innovation behavior. Unlike static behavior (e.g., adaptive inventory ad-
justment), a producer not only perceives market demand through maintaining
a variety of product lines, but also evolve and improve the commodities as time
goes by. The evolving behaviors are captured by genetic parameters. In the
meantime, consumers' budget, preference, utility function, and willing-to-pay
determine the market demand. The next subsection will discuss the details of
parameters.
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2.1 Agent Engineering
Producer Parameters
(1) Working Capital (k) is a ¯rm's endowment used for production.
(2) Inventory Adjustment Rate (¸) adjusts inventory by excess demand
(ED) or excess supply of a speci¯c product. The adjustment process can
be de¯ned by qmt+1 = ¸ED + q
m
t , where ¸ 2 [0; 1] and qm represents
quantity of product m.
(3) Mark-up Rate (´) is a component of producer's asking price (askm),
which is calculated as askm = (1 + ´) ¹Cm, where ¹Cm is the average pro-
duction cost of product m.
(4) R&D Rate (°R&D) is the proportion of working capital spent on R&D.
The R&D working capital (kR&D) is determined by the following formula:
kR&D = °R&D£ (k¡kinv), where kinv is the capital invested in inventory
adjustment.
(5) R&D Ceiling (R&D) de¯nes the maximum usage of R&D resource. Due
to the limited market size, R&D expenditure should not increase without
boundary.
(6) Cost per Node (c) is the unit production cost of using a terminal or
function node. It is assumed that the costs of terminal and function nodes
are the same.
Consumer Parameters
(1) Consumer Income (I) is a consumer's endowment exogenously given
at the beginning of each period, which usually has a crucial impact on
market demand.
(2) Depth of Preference (dp) de¯nes the total tree depth of a consumer's
preference. The deeper the preference, the more sophisticated a consumer
may be.
(3) Depth of Common Preference (dc) is the depth of identical preference
tree structure shared among all consumers.
(4) Base of Preference to Utility (z) is a component of the utility func-
tion. It is normally greater than 2 to ensure the synergy e®ect. 1
(5) Price to Utility Ratio (v) determines a consumer's subjective valuation
of a particular product, which is also known as the willingness-to-pay (i.e.
bid). It is calculated as bid = v£Um, where Um is the consumer's utility
level for product m.
(6) Search Intensity (rs) is the percentage of total producers that will be
selected. In other words, the selection intensity determines how many
producers will be visited by a consumer, which is calculated as rs £ np.
1 The synergy e®ect of the consumer preference is de¯ned in Section 2.3.
4
Genetic Parameters
(1) Initialization of Tree. According Koza (1992), there are three methods
to initialize a tree population. They are growth method, full method, and
ramped half-and-half method (a mixed of the growth and full method). In
this paper, we use full method to set consumer common preference, and
the ramped half-and-half for heterogeneous preference and commodity.
(2) Number of Primitives (½) is the size of terminal set and function set.
(3) Initial Tree Depth (dini) restricts the depth of the ¯rst generation
commodity tree. 2
(4) Maximum Tree Depth (dmax) describes the maximum commodity tree
depth allowed in this simulation. In order to satisfy consumer preference,
it is normally higher than dp and is limited to computer capacity (e.g.,
memory size).
(5) Tournament Size Ratio (rts) determines the tournament population
(POP jts) size used to run genetic operators. It is de¯ned as POP
j
ts =
rts£POP j, where POP j represents the whole commodity population of
producer j.
(6) Crossover Rate (pc) is the probability of recombining the most two
pro¯table commodity trees in the tournament population.
(7) Mutation Rate (pm) is the chance to alter o®spring's terminal or func-
tion nodes or sub-trees after crossover.
(8) Automatically De¯ned Terminal (ADT ) is a prototype which can be
used to produce higher level of commodities. 3
2.2 Environment Design
This subsection introduces the underlying learning cycle and market rules for
¯rms and consumers. As mentioned earlier, a ¯rm may maximize pro¯t by
producing various products, hereby learning consumer preference. As shown
in Fig. 2, the GP driven innovation process constitutes a series of new prod-
ucts launched every generation. In this paper, the model runs 5,000 genera-
tions, each calibrating with ¯ve trading days. After each learning cycle, a ¯rm
determines what to produce (including new products developed via product
innovation), how many to produce, as well as the price to charge for the next
generation. Such decision is based on the feedbacks (e.g. sales and pro¯t statis-
tics) collected from the previous generation.
The trading between buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers) is also regu-
2 Due to the lack of market (demand) information, this setting captures the initial
stage of producers' behavior, which is to produce less complex and more diverse
commodities.
3 See Chen and Chie (2007) for details.
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Fig. 2. Market days and learning cycles.
lated by some market rules. First, a buyer will research all available products
in the marker before making a purchasing decision. The pricing strategy estab-
lished by the sellers is a take-it-or-leave-it o®er based on respective cost and
mark-up rate. A buyer's strategy, on the other hand, is to maximize consumer
surplus which can be de¯ned as:
max(bidim ¡ askjm), 8j;m (1)
and a transaction can be described as
buyijm =
½
1 if bidim ¸ askjm and qjm > 0
0 otherwise.
where buyijm is a binary indicator. When it equals one, a transaction will be
carried out, and the price of productm will be P jm = ask
j
m; otherwise, no trans-
action will take place. If, however, product m was sold out (i.e., qjm = 0), the
consumer will select the second best choice and the rest may be deduced anal-
ogously until bidim < ask
j
m. The shortage of product m will then be recorded
in the log as exceed demand by producer j. In other words, each consumer
will at most purchase one product in each trading day. In addition, to avoid
negative shopping experience, a consumer's failing to purchase a commodity
from a seller today may lower the probability of his or her meeting the same
seller tomorrow, which can be described as
Probijk =
1 +
Pk
i=1 buy
ijk
m
k + np
: (2)
where Probijk is the probability that consumer i has met producer j for k
times, and np is the number of producers. The search intensity (rs) of a con-
sumer also plays an important role in the trading process. The search space for
a consumer is denoted by round(rs £ np), where round() represents round-o®
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Table 1
Parameter Settings
Parameter Tyep (Variable) Range Default Value
Producer
Number of Producers Integer (np) [1, 1) 1
Initial Working Capital Integer (K0) [1, 1) 500
Working Capital per Gen. Integer (K) [1, 1) 500
Inventory Adjustment Rate Real (¸) [0, 1] 80%
Mark-up Rate Real (´) [0, 1) 100%
R&D Rate Real (°R&D) [0, 1] 1%
R&D Ceiling Real (R&D) [0, 1) 500
Cost per Node Real (c) [0, 1) 1.0
Genetic Operator
Number of Primitives Integer (½) [1, 1) 5
Initial Tree Depth Integer (dini) [1, 1] 5
Maximum Tree Depth Integer (dmax) [1, 1] 11
Tournament Size Ratio Real (rts) [0, 1] 10%
Crossover Rate Real (pc) [0, 1] 90%
Mutation Rate Real (pm) [0, 1] 80%
Automatically De¯ne Function Boolean (ADT) T, F T
Consumer
Number of Consumers Integer (nc) [1, 1) 100
Consumer Income per Gen. Integer (I) [1, 1) 10000
Depth of Consumer Preference Integer (dp) [1, 1] 6
Depth of Common Preference Integer (dc) [1, dp] 5
Base of Preference to Utility Integer (z) [2, 10] 4
Price to Utility Ratio Real (º) [0, 1) 5.0
Search Intensity Real (rs) [0, 1] 100%
Time Schedule
Trading Days per Gen. Integer (Day) [1, 1) 5
Number of Generations (Gen.) Integer (Gen) [1, 1) 5000
function. 4 When rs < 100%, only portion of the producers may be included in
a buyer's shopping list. For example, if there are two producers and a hundred
consumers, and consumer 1 has completed eight shopping experiences, which
are zero bad and ¯ve good transactions with producer 1 and two bad and one
good transactions with producer 2, the consumer's updated probabilities for
the two producers are [Prob115;Prob123] = [0:86; 0:4]. After re-scale the prob-
ability [Prob115;Prob123] = [0:68; 0:32], and then when rs = 0:5, the consumer
will have more tendency to choose producer 1 next time. In other words, in
the case of rs = 100%, the value of Probijk will not a®ect the search space of
a consumer, because all the producers will be visited by each consumer. Table
1 summarizes the parameters applied in this model.
4 The function rounds o® rs £ np to the nearest integer.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of a product.
 
Fig. 4. An illustration of the common preference of a consumer.
2.3 Commodity and Preference
The commodity in the model is represented as a parse tree which is shown
in Fig. 3. Each parse tree corresponds to a LIST program. 5 The terminal
leaves correspond to the raw inputs (materials) X1, X2, ..., whereas the root
and all intermediate nodes represent the processors, F1, F2, ..., applied to
these raw materials in a bottom-up order, as the usual behavior of a LIST
program. The whole parse tree can, therefore, be interpreted as a production
process associated with the commodity. The unit cost of the commodity is a
function of the number of processors and the number of raw inputs, i.e., it is a
positive function of the node complexity of the commodity. In a simpler way,
we assume that the unit cost is a linear function of the node complexity. 6
The preference of the consumers is also represented by a GP tree. To make the
preference tree well-behaved in economics, three assumptions have been made
in Chen and Chie (2004), namely, the monotone, synergy, and consistency
condition. In our simulation, there are 100 consumers in the market. Each
consumer has a preference tree with a depth of six. Viewed from the topmost
level (the root level), the preference tree is composed of two modules. The
one on the left, having a depth of ¯ve as shown in the Fig. 4, is identical
5 In the case of Fig. 3, the product can be represented as a LIST program form,
(F7(F9X5X11)(F12X3(F9X3X8))).
6 The cost function can be de¯ned by C(N), where N is the used number of func-
tional and terminal nodes. The positive function is de¯ned by dCdN > 0, and the
linear function is de¯ned by dCdN = c, where c is a constant.
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among all consumers, whereas the one on the right, having a depth of ¯ve
or less, is heterogeneous, and is randomly generated by the ramped half-and-
half method, an initialization method frequently used in GP. In this way,
consumers' preferences have a common part as well as an idiosyncratic part.
The example of an idiosyncratic part is shown in Table 2.
The utility of consuming a commodity is based on measuring the degree of
similarity between commodity and preference. Chen and Chie (2006) has de-
veloped a module-matching algorithm to perform the task of matching each
commodity module (subtree) with each preference module in a descending or-
der relating to the depth of the tree. Under this mechanism, the biggest module
will be processed ¯rst; if it is successfully matched, the process will stop, oth-
erwise, it will proceed to process the second biggest commodity module until
the commodity modules are exhausted. To satisfy the synergy condition and
hence the idea of added-value, Chen and Chie (2006) assumes a power utility
function for the preference tree as
U(Sd;j)=
½
zd¡1; if j is matched
0; otherwise;
(3)
U =
X
j
U(Sd;j): (4)
Each of the modular preference (Sd;j) is sorted by the depths (d), where j is the
index of the subtree. The raw utility U(:) is generated by Equation (3) with
base z, where z ¸ 2. As a result, the utility U is exponentially increasing when
higher levels of modular preferences are satis¯ed. To demonstrate the utility
calculation, we use the product in Fig. 3 and the idiosyncratic preference in
Table 2 as an example. The ¯rst biggest commodity module is the commodity
itself, which is (F7(F9X5X11)(F12X3(F9X3X8))). However, it fail to match any
one of preference module in Table 2. Then we try the next biggest commod-
ity module, which is (F12X3(F9X3X8)). It still match none of the preference
module. The process stops when the next commodity module (F9X3X8) and
(F9X5X11) match with S2;1 and S2;2 respectively. It should also be noted that
there is another commodity element X3 matches preference at the ¯rst level
of depth. As a result, as Equation (3) shows, the commodity total gets 5 units
of utility from the idiosyncratic preference.
Table 2
An example of idiosyncratic modular preference (z = 2)
Depth (d) Subtrees or terminals z(d¡1)
1 X3; X5; X8; X11 1
2 S2;1 = (F9X3X8) 2
S2;2 = (F9X5X11)
3 S3;1 = (F5X3(F9X5X11)) 4
4 S4;1 = (F2(F9X3X8)(F5X3(F9X5X11))) 8
5 S5 = (F6X3(F2(F9X3X8)(F5X3(F9X5X11)))) 16
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3 Market Selection and Consumer Satisfaction
Table 3
Parameters of Search Intensity
Parameter Type (Variable) Range Value
High Search Intensity
Number of Firms Integer (np) [1, 1) 2
Search Intensity Real (rs) [0, 1] 100%
Low Search Intensity
Number of Firms Integer (np) [1, 1) 2
Search Intensity Real (rs) [0, 1] 50%
Note: The rest of the parameter settings are the same as Table 1.
This section explores the in°uence of two kinds of consumer search abilities,
presented in Table 3. With low selection pressure, each consumer meets only
one of the two ¯rms. On the contrary, it is found that high selection pressure
may foster the meeting of both ¯rms on every trading day. With limited mar-
ket demand, the higher the search intensity, the higher the market selection
pressure. 7 For purpose of further analysis, statistics about consumer satis-
faction in each generation are reported. Consumer satisfaction is normalized
by dividing the consumer surplus received from consumption with the maxi-
mum potential surplus of the consumer, multiplied by 1000. In other words,
the normalized value will lie in [0, 1000]. Averaging the consumer satisfaction
over all 100 consumers, we then derive the aggregate consumer satisfaction,
which also lies in the same interval. The result is shown in Fig. 5, which is
the maximum average value of all the experimental runs. Since the variation
of high search intensity case is much larger than the low search intensity one,
we collected 100 runs for the former and 50 runs for the latter to achieve
statistical validity. As illustrated in Fig. 5, consumer satisfaction rises with
his or her own search ability. However, the survivability of these two ¯rms
is rather di®erent. Both ¯rms can survive under low selection pressure, but
the situation changes dramatically under high selection pressure. Under the
severe selection pressure scenario, usually one ¯rm survives. Nonetheless, after
examining the all experimental results, the chance of the success in either case
do not have signi¯cant di®erence. In the next section, we will further investi-
gate the parameters of genetic operator from a competitive advantage point
of view.
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Fig. 5. Time series of consumer search intensity and consumer satisfaction.
Table 4
Parameters of Genetic Operator Rates
Parameter Type (Variable) Range Value
Crossover Rate Competition
Number of Firms Integer (np) [1, 1) 2
Crossover Rate Real (pc) [0, 1] (1) 45% (2) 90%
Mutation Rate Competition
Number or Firms Integer (np) [1, 1) 2
Mutation Rate Real (pm) [0, 1] (1) 40% (2) 80%
Note: (1), (2) are the parameters for low-rate ¯rm and high-rate ¯rm respectively.
4 Genetic Operator and Competitiveness
As shown in the previous section, compared to the low selection pressure en-
vironment, high selection pressure not only brings more consumer satisfaction
but increases the overall market competition as well. To understand how ge-
netic operators may in°uence a ¯rm's competitiveness and hence the level of
market competition, we have further investigated the e®ects of crossover rates
and mutation rates in a high selection pressure setting of two ¯rms. We have
considered the following two scenarios:
² Scenario 1: High crossover rate (90%) versus low crossover rate (45%)
² Scenario 2: High mutation rate (80%) versus low mutation rate (40%)
Table 4 has summarized the relevant parameters. 8 With simulation, the sur-
vivability (which is positively correlated to competitiveness) of the two ¯rms
under di®erent settings can be unveiled through monitoring respective market
share at di®erent time horizon. Market share is calculated as the total sales
of each ¯rm divided by the total sales of the market. 9
7 Note that our consumers are allowed to buy at most one commodity each trading
day.
8 The rest of the parameter settings are the same as Table 1.
9 As a ¯rm may produce more than one product, its total sales are normally gen-
erated from a bundle of products. Similarly, the total sales of market is measured
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In this study, we have simulated 100 runs for each scenario. Results of the
two scenarios can be found in Fig. 6. Means of the 100 runs are presented on
the left, whereas the medians are on the right. The shaded area represents
the market share of the low-rate ¯rm as time goes by; the complement is the
market share of the high-rate ¯rm. As can be seen, the low-rate ¯rm seldom
owns more than half of the market share and hence is dominated in a market
of high competition. This coincides with our earlier ¯nding that when the
selection pressure is high, usually one of the two ¯rms dominates the market.
Despite the rates under investigation, it is also found that the behaviors of the
two kinds of time-series are rather di®erent. While the means are relatively
smooth below the midline, the medians imply that competition may cause
more extremity overtime.
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Fig. 6. Genetic operator rates and competitiveness.
In addition to the above ¯ndings, we would like to interpret the impacts
of genetic operators from an economic point of view. Crossover describes
the activity of exchanging information, whereas mutation is the process of
deviation from former position. Higher crossover rates raise the probability
of information-exchanging and encourage recombining innovative ideas. Al-
though crossover and mutation sometimes may bring destructive results, they
have been found useful in discovering and preserving good ideas. This has also
been suggested by Goldberg (2002) in his book \The Design of Innovation."
With genetic operators, it is possible to simulate the impacts of various or-
ganizational cultures or attitudes. For example, a progressive (e.g. high-rate)
¯rm may supply more innovative commodities to the market and face more
uncertainty in selling those products. Meanwhile, a conservative (e.g. low-rate)
¯rm may adhere to former designs, failing to catch up with market trend. As
based on all the available products in the market at a particular point of generation.
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a result, it is likely that a low-rate ¯rm would be driven out of market due to
loss of consumer satisfaction.
5 Concluding Remarks
Consumers and ¯rms behavior can be studied and the patterns can be ex-
tracted. In this paper, we studied the signi¯cance of genetic operators in
product innovation and market selection. Two observations have been found
in this study. First, selection pressure is positively correlated with consumer
satisfaction. The more the pressure experienced in a ¯rm's production, the
higher the satisfaction level of a consumer can achieve. Selection pressure is
de¯ned in terms of the number of choices consumers have. If no choice being
granted, products with low quality or little invention may still be selected.
However, the more the choices, the better a consumer becomes enhanced of
his or her own satisfaction.
In addition, parameters of genetic operator are crucial in determining the
competencies of producers. In our agent-based two-¯rm model, two producers
with di®erent crossover and mutation rates compete with each other in inno-
vation. It is found that product innovation takes not only modularity but also
proper settings of genetic operator. Various parameters of genetic operator
may represent di®erent organizational cultures. This mechanism provides an
opportunity to observe the competition between an open-minded culture and
a more conservative one.
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A Appendix
Pseudo Code:
0: Initialize Market, Consumers, and Firms
1: Ask Firms [ Initialize Commodities
2: Pricing Commodities
3: Waiting for Consumers ]
4: Do While day mod 5 <> 0 [
5: Ask Consumers [ Decide Shopping List
6: Visit Firms on Shopping List
7: Buying Commodities
8: Update Experiences of Visited Firms
9: day ++ ] ]
10: Do While generation < 5000
11: [
12: generation ++
13: Ask Firms [ Acquire Statistics
14: Adjust Inventory
15: Innovation
16: Pricing Commodities
17: Waiting for Consumers ]
18: Do While day mod 5 <> 0 [
19: Ask Consumers [ Decide Shopping List
20: Visit Firms on Shopping List
21: Buying Commodities
22: Update Experiences of Visited Firms
23: day ++ ] ]
24: ]
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